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Abstract
This paper considers a class of strategic scenarios in which two networks of agents have opposing objectives with regards to
the optimization of a common objective function. In the resulting zero-sum game, individual agents collaborate with neighbors
in their respective network and have only partial knowledge of the state of the agents in the other network. For the case
when the interaction topology of each network is undirected, we synthesize a distributed saddle-point strategy and establish
its convergence to the Nash equilibrium for the class of strictly concave-convex and locally Lipschitz objective functions. We
also show that this dynamics does not converge in general if the topologies are directed. This justifies the introduction, in the
directed case, of a generalization of this distributed dynamics which we show converges to the Nash equilibrium for the class
of strictly concave-convex differentiable functions with globally Lipschitz gradients. The technical approach combines tools
from algebraic graph theory, nonsmooth analysis, set-valued dynamical systems, and game theory.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing interest on net-
worked strategic scenarios where agents may cooperate
or compete with each other towards the achievement of
some objective, interact across different layers, have ac-
cess to limited information, and are subject to evolving
interaction topologies. This paper is a contribution to
this body of work. Specifically, we consider a class of
strategic scenarios in which two networks of agents are
involved in a zero-sum game. We assume that the objec-
tive function can be decomposed as a sum of concave-
convex functions and that the networks have opposing
objectives regarding its optimization. Agents collaborate
with the neighbors in their own network and have partial
information about the state of the agents in the other
network. Such scenarios are challenging because infor-
mation is spread across the agents and possibly multiple
⋆ Incomplete versions of this paper were presented
as (Gharesifard and Corte´s, 2012a) in the American Control
Conference 2012 and as (Gharesifard and Corte´s, 2012b) in
the IEEE Control and Decision Conference 2012. This work
was performed while B. Gharesifard was a postdoctoral re-
searcher at the University of California, San Diego.
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layers, and networks, by themselves, are not the decision
makers. Our aim is to design a distributed coordination
algorithm that can be used by the agents to converge
to the Nash equilibrium. Note that, for a 2-player zero-
sum game of the type considered here, a pure Nash equi-
librium corresponds to a saddle point of the objective
function.
Literature review. Multiple scenarios involving net-
worked systems and intelligent adversaries in sensor
networks, filtering, finance, and wireless communica-
tions (Kim and Boyd, 2008; Wan and Lemmon, 2009)
can be cast into the strategic framework described above.
In such scenarios, the network objective arises as a result
of the aggregation of agent-to-agent adversarial interac-
tions regarding a common goal, and information is nat-
urally distributed among the agents. The present work
has connections with the literature on distributed opti-
mization and zero-sumgames. The distributed optimiza-
tion of a sum of convex functions has been intensively
studied in recent years, see e.g. (Nedic and Ozdaglar,
2009; Wan and Lemmon, 2009; Johansson et al., 2009;
Zhu and Mart´ınez, 2012). These works build on
consensus-based dynamics (Olfati-Saber et al., 2007;
Ren and Beard, 2008; Bullo et al., 2009;Mesbahi and Egerstedt,
2010) to find the solutions of the optimization problem
in a variety of scenarios and are designed in discrete
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time. Exceptions include (Wang and Elia, 2010, 2011)
on continuous-time distributed optimization on undi-
rected networks and (Gharesifard and Corte´s, 2012c)
on directed networks.
Regarding zero-sum games, the works (Arrow et al.,
1958; Maistroskii, 1977; Nedic and Ozdgalar, 2009)
study the convergence of discrete-time subgradi-
ent dynamics to a saddle point. Continuous-time
best-response dynamics for zero-sum games con-
verges to the set of Nash equilibria for both convex-
concave (Hofbauer and Sorin, 2006) and quasiconvex-
quasiconcave (Barron et al., 2010) functions. Under
strict convexity-concavity assumptions, continuous-
time subgradient flow dynamics converges to a saddle
point (Arrow et al., 1951, 1958). Asymptotic conver-
gence is also guaranteed when the Hessian of the objec-
tive function is positive definite in one argument and
the function is linear in the other (Arrow et al., 1958;
Feijer and Paganini, 2010). The distributed computa-
tion of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games, where
all players are adversarial, has been investigated under
different assumptions. The algorithm in (Li and Bas¸ar,
1987) relies on all-to-all communication and does not
require players to know each other’s payoff functions
(which must be strongly convex). In (Frihauf et al.,
2012; Stankovic et al., 2012), players are unaware of
their own payoff functions but have access to the pay-
off value of an action once it has been executed. These
works design distributed strategies based on extremum
seeking techniques to seek the set of Nash equilibria.
Statement of contributions. We introduce the prob-
lem of distributed convergence to Nash equilibria for
two networks engaged in a strategic scenario. The net-
works aim to either maximize or minimize a common
objective function which can be written as a sum of
concave-convex functions. Individual agents collaborate
with neighbors in their respective network and have
partial knowledge of the state of the agents in the other
one. Our first contribution is the introduction of an
aggregate objective function for each network which
depends on the interaction topology through its Lapla-
cian and the characterization of a family of points with
a saddle property for the pair of functions. We show
the correspondence between these points and the Nash
equilibria of the overall game. When the graphs describ-
ing the interaction topologies within each network are
undirected, the gradients of these aggregate objective
functions are distributed. Building on this observation,
our second contribution is the synthesis of a consensus-
based saddle-point strategy for adversarial networks
with undirected topologies. We show that the proposed
dynamics is guaranteed to asymptotically converge to
the Nash equilibrium for the class of strictly concave-
convex and locally Lipschitz objective functions. Our
third contribution focuses on the directed case. We show
that the transcription of the saddle-point dynamics to
directed topologies fails to converge in general. This
leads us to propose a generalization of the dynamics,
for strongly connected weight-balanced topologies, that
incorporates a design parameter. We show that, by ap-
propriately choosing this parameter, the new dynamics
asymptotically converges to the Nash equilibrium for
the class of strictly concave-convex differentiable ob-
jective functions with globally Lipschitz gradients. The
technical approach employs notions and results from
algebraic graph theory, nonsmooth and convex anal-
ysis, set-valued dynamical systems, and game theory.
As an intermediate result in our proof strategy for the
directed case, we provide a generalization of the known
characterization of cocoercivity of concave functions to
concave-convex functions.
The results of this paper can be understood as a general-
ization to competing networks of the results we obtained
in (Gharesifard and Corte´s, 2012c) for distributed opti-
mization. This generalization is nontrivial because the
payoff functions associated to individual agents now also
depend on information obtained from the opposing net-
work. This feature gives rise to a hierarchy of saddle-
point dynamics whose analysis is technically challeng-
ing and requires, among other things, a reformulation of
the problem as a constrained zero-sum game, a careful
understanding of the coupling between the dynamics of
both networks, and the generalization of the notion of
cocoercivity to concave-convex functions.
Organization. Section 2 contains preliminaries on non-
smooth analysis, set-valued dynamical systems, graph
theory, and game theory. In Section 3, we introduce the
zero-sum game for two adversarial networks involved
in a strategic scenario and introduce two novel aggre-
gate objective functions. Section 4 presents our algo-
rithm design and analysis for distributed convergence to
Nash equilibrium when the network topologies are undi-
rected. Section 5 presents our treatment for the directed
case. Section 6 gathers our conclusions and ideas for fu-
ture work. Appendix A contains the generalization to
concave-convex functions of the characterization of co-
coercivity of concave functions.
2 Preliminaries
We start with some notational conventions. Let R, R≥0,
Z, Z≥1 denote the set of real, nonnegative real, integer,
and positive integer numbers, respectively. We denote
by || · || the Euclidean norm on Rd, d ∈ Z≥1 and also
use the short-hand notation 1d = (1, . . . , 1)
T and 0d =
(0, . . . , 0)T ∈ Rd. We let Id denote the identity matrix
in Rd×d. For matrices A ∈ Rd1×d2 and B ∈ Re1×e2 ,
d1, d2, e1, e2 ∈ Z≥1, we let A⊗B denote their Kronecker
product. The function f : X1 ×X2 → R, with X1 ⊂ Rd1 ,
X2 ⊂ Rd2 closed and convex, is concave-convex if it is
concave in its first argument and convex in the second
one (Rockafellar, 1997). A point (x∗1, x∗2) ∈ X1 × X2 is
a saddle point of f if f(x1, x
∗
2) ≤ f(x∗1, x∗2) ≤ f(x∗1, x2)
for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2. Finally, a set-valued map
f : Rd ⇒ Rd takes elements of Rd to subsets of Rd.
2
2.1 Nonsmooth analysis
We recall some notions from nonsmooth analy-
sis (Clarke, 1983). A function f : Rd → R is locally
Lipschitz at x ∈ Rd if there exists a neighborhood U of
x and Cx ∈ R≥0 such that |f(y) − f(z)| ≤ Cx||y − z||,
for y, z ∈ U . f is locally Lipschitz on Rd if it is locally
Lipschitz at x for all x ∈ Rd and globally Lipschitz on
R
d if for all y, z ∈ Rd there exists C ∈ R≥0 such that
|f(y) − f(z)| ≤ C||y − z||. Locally Lipschitz functions
are differentiable almost everywhere. The generalized
gradient of f is
∂f(x) = co
{
lim
k→∞
∇f(xk) | xk → x, xk /∈ Ωf ∪ S
}
,
where Ωf is the set of points where f fails to be differ-
entiable and S is any set of measure zero.
Lemma 2.1 (Continuity of the generalized gradi-
ent map): Let f : Rd → R be a locally Lipschitz func-
tion at x ∈ Rd. Then the set-valued map ∂f : Rd ⇒ Rd
is upper semicontinuous and locally bounded at x ∈ Rd
and moreover, ∂f(x) is nonempty, compact, and convex.
For f : Rd × Rd → R and z ∈ Rd, we let ∂xf(x, z) de-
note the generalized gradient of x 7→ f(x, z). Similarly,
for x ∈ Rd, we let ∂zf(x, z) denote the generalized gra-
dient of z 7→ f(x, z). A point x ∈ Rd with 0 ∈ ∂f(x) is
a critical point of f . A function f : Rd → R is regular at
x ∈ R if for all v ∈ Rd the right directional derivative of
f , in the direction of v, exists at x and coincides with the
generalized directional derivative of f at x in the direc-
tion of v. We refer the reader to (Clarke, 1983) for defi-
nitions of these notions. A convex and locally Lipschitz
function at x is regular (Clarke, 1983, Proposition 2.3.6).
The notion of regularity plays an important role when
considering sums of Lipschitz functions.
Lemma 2.2 (Finite sum of locally Lipschitz func-
tions): Let {f i}ni=1 be locally Lipschitz at x ∈ Rd. Then
∂(
∑n
i=1 f
i)(x) ⊆ ∑ni=1 ∂f i(x), and equality holds if f i
is regular for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A locally Lipschitz and convex function f satisfies, for
all x, x′ ∈ Rd and ξ ∈ ∂f(x), the first-order condition of
convexity,
f(x′)− f(x) ≥ ξ · (x′ − x). (1)
2.2 Set-valued dynamical systems
Here, we recall some background on set-valued dynami-
cal systems following Corte´s (2008). A continuous-time
set-valued dynamical system on X ⊂ Rd is a differential
inclusion
x˙(t) ∈ Ψ(x(t)) (2)
where t ∈ R≥0 and Ψ : X ⊂ Rd ⇒ Rd is a set-valued
map. A solution to this dynamical system is an abso-
lutely continuous curve x : [0, T ]→ X which satisfies (2)
almost everywhere. The set of equilibria of (2) is denoted
by Eq(Ψ) = {x ∈ X | 0 ∈ Ψ(x)}.
Lemma 2.3 (Existence of solutions): For Ψ : Rd ⇒
R
d upper semicontinuous with nonempty, compact, and
convex values, there exists a solution to (2) from any
initial condition.
TheLaSalle InvariancePrinciple for set-valued continuous-
time systems is helpful to establish the asymptotic
stability properties of systems of the form (2). A set
W ⊂ X is weakly positively invariant with respect to
Ψ if for any x ∈ W , there exists x˜ ∈ X such that
x˜ ∈ Ψ(x). The set W is strongly positively invariant
with respect to Ψ if Ψ(x) ⊂ W , for all x ∈ W . Finally,
the set-valued Lie derivative of a differentiable function
V : Rd → R with respect to Ψ at x ∈ Rd is defined by
L˜ΨV (x) = {v · ∇V (x) | v ∈ Ψ(x)}.
Theorem 2.4 (Set-valued LaSalle Invariance
Principle): LetW ⊂ X be a strongly positively invariant
under (2) and V : X → R a continuously differentiable
function. Suppose the evolutions of (2) are bounded and
max L˜ΨV (x) ≤ 0 or L˜ΨV (x) = ∅, for all x ∈ W . If
SΨ,V = {x ∈ X | 0 ∈ L˜ΨV (x)}, then any solution x(t),
t ∈ R≥0, starting in W converges to the largest weakly
positively invariant setM contained in S¯Ψ,V ∩W . When
M is a finite collection of points, then the limit of each
solution equals one of them.
2.3 Graph theory
We present some basic notions from algebraic graph the-
ory following the exposition in (Bullo et al., 2009). A
directed graph, or simply digraph, is a pair G = (V , E),
where V is a finite set called the vertex set and E ⊆ V×V
is the edge set. A digraph is undirected if (v, u) ∈ E any-
time (u, v) ∈ E . We refer to an undirected digraph as a
graph. A path is an ordered sequence of vertices such that
any ordered pair of vertices appearing consecutively is
an edge of the digraph. A digraph is strongly connected if
there is a path between any pair of distinct vertices. For
a graph, we refer to this notion simply as connected. A
weighted digraph is a triplet G = (V , E ,A), where (V , E)
is a digraph and A ∈ Rn×n≥0 is the adjacency matrix of G,
with the property that aij > 0 if (vi, vj) ∈ E and aij = 0,
otherwise. The weighted out-degree and in-degree of vi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are respectively, dwout(vi) =
∑n
j=1 aij and
dwin(vi) =
∑n
j=1 aji. The weighted out-degree matrix Dout
is the diagonal matrix defined by (Dout)ii = d
w
out(i), for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The Laplacian matrix is L = Dout−A.
Note that L1n = 0. If G is strongly connected, then zero
is a simple eigenvalue of L. G is undirected if L = LT and
weight-balanced if dwout(v) = d
w
in(v), for all v ∈ V . Equiv-
alently, G is weight-balanced if and only if 1TnL = 0 if and
only if L+ LT is positive semidefinite. Furthermore, if G
is weight-balanced and strongly connected, then zero is
a simple eigenvalue of L+ LT . Note that any undirected
graph is weight-balanced.
2.4 Zero-sum games
We recall basic game-theoretic notions followingBas¸ar and Olsder
(1999). An n-player game is a triplet G = (P,X, U),
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where P is the set of players with |P | = n ∈ Z≥2,
X = X1 × . . .× Xn, Xi ⊂ Rdi is the set of (pure) strate-
gies of player vi ∈ P , di ∈ Z≥1, and U = (u1, . . . , un),
where ui : X → R is the payoff function of player vi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The game G is called a zero-sum game
if
∑n
i=1 ui = 0. An outcome x
∗ ∈ X is a (pure) Nash
equilibrium of G if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all xi ∈ Xi,
ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≥ ui(xi, x∗−i),
where x−i denotes the actions of all players other than vi.
In this paper, we focus on a class of two-player zero-sum
games which have at least one pure Nash equilibrium as
the next result states.
Theorem 2.5 (Minmax theorem): Let X1 ⊂ Rd1
and X2 ⊂ Rd2 , d1, d2 ∈ Z≥1, be nonempty, compact, and
convex. If u : X1 × X2 → R is continuous and the sets
{x′ ∈ X1 | u(x′, y) ≥ α} and {y′ ∈ X2 | u(x, y′) ≤ α} are
convex for all x ∈ X1, y ∈ X2, and α ∈ R, then
max
x
min
y
u(x, y) = min
y
max
x
u(x, y).
Theorem 2.5 implies that the game G = ({v1, v2},X1 ×
X2, (u,−u)) has a pure Nash equilibrium.
3 Problem statement
Consider two networks Σ1 and Σ2 composed of agents
{v1, . . . , vn1} and agents {w1, . . . , wn2}, respectively.
Throughout this paper, Σ1 and Σ2 are either connected
undirected graphs, c.f. Section 4, or strongly connected
weight-balanced digraphs, c.f. Section 5. Since the lat-
ter case includes the first one, throughout this section,
we assume the latter. The state of Σ1, denoted x1, be-
longs to X1 ⊂ Rd1 , d1 ∈ Z≥1. Likewise, the state of Σ2,
denoted x2, belongs to X2 ⊂ Rd2 , d2 ∈ Z≥1. In this pa-
per, we do not get into the details of what these states
represent (as a particular case, the network state could
correspond to the collection of the states of agents in
it). In addition, each agent vi in Σ1 has an estimate
xi1 ∈ Rd1 of what the network state is, which may differ
from the actual value x1. Similarly, each agent wj in Σ2
has an estimate xj2 ∈ Rd2 of what the network state is.
Within each network, neighboring agents can share their
estimates. Networks can also obtain information about
each other. This is modeled by means of a bipartite
directed graph Σeng, called engagement graph, with dis-
joint vertex sets {v1, . . . , vn1} and {w1, . . . , wn2}, where
every agent has at least one out-neighbor. According to
this model, an agent in Σ1 obtains information from its
out-neighbors in Σeng about their estimates of the state
of Σ2, and vice versa.
Figure 1 illustrates this concept.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n1}, let f i1 : X1 × X2 → R be a
locally Lipschitz concave-convex function only available
to agent vi ∈ Σ1. Similarly, let f j2 : X1 × X2 → R be a
locally Lipschitz concave-convex function only available
to agent wj ∈ Σ2, j ∈ {1, . . . , n2}. The networks Σ1 and
Σ1
Σ2
Σeng
w1
w2
w3
w4
v1
v2
v3
Fig. 1. Networks Σ1 and Σ2 engaged in a strategic scenario.
Both networks are strongly connected and weight-balanced,
with weights of 1 on each edge. Edges which correspond to
Σeng are dashed.
Σ2 are engaged in a zero-sum game with payoff function
U : X1 × X2 → R
U(x1, x2) =
n1∑
i=1
f i1(x1, x2) =
n2∑
j=1
f j2 (x1, x2), (3)
where Σ1 wishes to maximize U , while Σ2 wishes to min-
imize it. The objective of the networks is therefore to
settle upon a Nash equilibrium, i.e., to solve the follow-
ing maxmin problem
max
x1∈X1
min
x2∈X2
U(x1, x2). (4)
We refer to the this zero-sum game as the 2-network zero-
sum game and denote it byGadv-net = (Σ1,Σ2,Σeng, U).
We assume that X1 ⊂ Rd1 and X2 ⊂ Rd2 are compact
convex. For convenience, let x1 = (x
1
1, . . . , x
n1
1 )
T and
x2 = (x
1
2, . . . , x
n2
2 )
T denote vector of agent estimates
about the state of the respective networks.
Remark 3.1 (Power allocation in communication
channels in the presence of adversaries): Here
we present an example from communications inspired
by (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, Section 5.5.3). Con-
sider n Gaussian communication channels, each with
signal power pi ∈ R≥0 and noise power ηi ∈ R≥0, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The capacity of each channel is propor-
tional to log(1 + βpi/(σi + ηi)), where β ∈ R>0 and
σi > 0 is the receiver noise. Note that capacity is con-
cave in pi and convex in ηi. Both signal and noise powers
must satisfy a budget constraint, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 pi = P and∑n
i=1 ηi = C, for some given P,C ∈ R>0. Two networks
of n agents are involved in this scenario, one, Σ1, select-
ing signal powers to maximize capacity, the other one,
Σ2, selecting noise powers to minimize it. The network
Σ1 has decided that m1 channels will have signal power
x1, while n− 1−m1 will have signal power x2. The re-
maining nth channel has its power determined to satisfy
the budget constraint, i.e., P −m1x1 − (n− 1−m1)x2.
Likewise, the network Σ2 does something similar with
m2 channels with noise power y1, n − 1 −m2 channels
with noise power y2, and one last channel with noise
power C−m2y1−(n−1−m2)y2. Each network is aware
of the partition made by the other one. The individual
4
objective function of the two agents (one from Σ1, the
other from Σ2) making decisions on the power levels
of the ith channel is the channel capacity itself. For
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, this takes the form
f i(x, y) = log
(
1 +
βxa
σi + yb
)
,
for some a, b ∈ {1, 2}. Here x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2).
For i = n, it takes instead the form
fn(x, y) = log
(
1 +
β(P −m1x1 − (n− 1−m1)x2)
σn + C −m2y1 − (n− 1−m2)y2
)
.
Note that
∑n
i=1 f
i(x, y) is the total capacity of the n
communication channels. •
3.1 Reformulation of the 2-network zero-sum game
In this section, we describe how agents in each net-
work use the information obtained from their neighbors
to compute the value of their own objective functions.
Based on these estimates, we introduce a reformulation
of the Gadv-net = (Σ1,Σ2,Σeng, U) which is instrumen-
tal for establishing some of our results.
Each agent in Σ1 has a locally Lipschitz, concave-convex
function f˜ i1 : R
d1 × Rd2n2 → R with the properties:
(Extension of own payoff function): for any x1 ∈
R
d1 , x2 ∈ Rd2 ,
f˜ i1(x1,1n2 ⊗ x2) = f i1(x1, x2). (5a)
(Distributed over Σeng): there exists f
i
1 : R
d1 ×
R
d2|N inΣeng (vi)| → R such that, for any x1 ∈ Rd1
x2 ∈ Rd2n2 ,
f˜ i1(x1,x2) = f
i
1(x1, π
i
1(x2)), (5b)
with πi1 : R
d2n2 → Rd2|N outΣeng (vi)| the projection of x2
to the values received by vi from its out-neighbors
in Σeng.
Equation (5a) states the fact that, when the estimates
of all neighbors of an agent in the opponent’s network
agree, its evaluation should coincide with this estimate.
Equation (5b) states the fact that agents can only use
the information received from their neighbors in the in-
teraction topology to compute their new estimates.
Each agent in Σ2 has a function f˜
j
2 : R
d1n1 × Rd2 → R
with similar properties. The collective payoff functions
of the two networks are
U˜1(x1,x2) =
n1∑
i=1
f˜ i1(x
i
1,x2), (6a)
U˜2(x1,x2) =
n2∑
j=1
f˜ j2 (x1, x
j
2). (6b)
In general, the functions U˜1 and U˜2 need not be the same.
However, U˜1(1n1 ⊗ x1,1n1 ⊗ x2) = U˜2(1n1 ⊗ x1,1n1 ⊗
x2), for any x1 ∈ Rd1 , x2 ∈ Rd2 . When both functions
coincide, the next result shows that the original game
can be lifted to a (constrained) zero-sum game.
Lemma 3.2 (Reformulation of the 2-network
zero-sum game): Assume that the individual pay-
off functions {f˜ i1}n1i=1, {f˜ j2}n2j=1 satisfying (5) are such
that the network payoff functions defined in (6) sat-
isfy U˜1 = U˜2, and let U˜ denote this common function.
Then, the problem (4) on Rd1 × Rd2 is equivalent to the
following problem on Rn1d1 × Rn2d2 ,
max
x1∈Xn11
min
x2∈Xn22
U˜(x1,x2),
subject to L1x1 = 0n1d1 , L2x2 = 0n2d2 , (7)
with Lℓ = Lℓ⊗ Idℓ and Lℓ the Laplacian of Σℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. The proof follows by noting that (i) U˜(1n1 ⊗
x1,1n2 ⊗ x2) = U(x1, x2) for all x1 ∈ Rd1 and x2 ∈
R
d2 and (ii) since G1 and G2 are strongly connected,
L1x1 = 0n1d1 and L2x2 = 0n2d2 iff x1 = 1n1 ⊗ x1 and
x2 = 1n2 ⊗ x2 for some x1 ∈ Rd1 and x2 ∈ Rd2 . ✷
Remark 3.3 (Restrictions on extensions): The as-
sumption of Lemma 3.2 does not hold in general for all
sets of extensions satisfying (5a) and (5b). If the interac-
tion topology is one-to-one (i.e., both networks have the
same number of agents, the interaction topology is undi-
rected, and each agent in the first network obtains infor-
mation only from one agent in the opposing network),
the natural extensions satisfy the assumption. Exam-
ple 5.5 later provides yet another instance of a different
nature. In general, determining if it is always possible to
choose the extensions in such a way that the assumption
holds is an open problem. •
We denote by G˜adv-net = (Σ1,Σ2,Σeng, U˜) the con-
strained zero-sum game defined by (7) and refer to
this situation by saying that Gadv-net can be lifted
to G˜adv-net. Our objective is to design a coordination
algorithm that is implementable with the information
that agents in Σ1 and Σ2 possess and leads them to find
a Nash equilibrium of G˜adv-net, which corresponds to
a Nash equilibrium of Gadv-net by Lemma 3.2. Achiev-
ing this goal, however, is nontrivial because individual
agents, not networks themselves, are the decision mak-
ers. From the point of view of agents in each network,
the objective is to agree on the states of both their own
network and the other network, and that the resulting
states correspond to a Nash equilibrium of Gadv-net.
The function U˜ is locally Lipschitz and concave-
convex. Moreover, from Lemma 2.2, the elements of
∂x1U˜(x1,x2) are of the form
g˜(x1,x2) = (g˜
1
(x1
1
,x2)
, . . . , g˜n(xn
1
,x2)
) ∈ ∂x1 U˜(x1,x2),
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where g˜i
(xi
1
,x2)
∈ ∂x1 f˜ i1(xi1,x2), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n1}. Note
that, because of (5b), we have ∂x1 f˜
i
1(x
i
1,1n2 ⊗ x2) =
∂x1f
i
1(x
i
1, x2). A similar reasoning can be followed to de-
scribe the elements of ∂x2U˜(x1,x2). Next, we present a
characterization of the Nash equilibria of G˜adv-net, in-
strumental for proving some of our upcoming results.
Proposition 3.4 (Characterization of the Nash
equilibria of G˜adv-net): For Σ1, Σ2 strongly connected
and weight-balanced, define F1 and F2 by
F1(x1, z1,x2) = −U˜(x1,x2) + xT1 L1z1 +
1
2
x
T
1 L1x1,
F2(x2, z2,x1) = U˜(x1,x2) + x
T
2 L2z2 +
1
2
x
T
2 L2x2.
Then, F1 and F2 are convex in their first argument, lin-
ear in their second one, and concave in their third one.
Moreover, assume (x∗1, z∗1 ,x∗2, z∗2) satisfies the following
saddle property for (F1, F2): (x
∗
1, z
∗
1) is a saddle point of
(x1, z1) 7→ F1(x1, z1,x∗2) and (x∗2, z∗2) is a saddle point
of (x2, z2) 7→ F2(x2, z2,x∗1). Then,
(i) (x∗1, z
∗
1 + 1n1 ⊗ a1,x∗2, z∗2 + 1n2 ⊗ a2) satisfies the
saddle property for (F1, F2) for any a1 ∈ Rd1 , a2 ∈
R
d2 , and
(ii) (x∗1,x∗2) is a Nash equilibrium of G˜adv-net.
Furthermore,
(iii) if (x∗1,x
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of G˜adv-net then
there exists z∗1 , z
∗
2 such that (x
∗
1, z
∗
1 ,x
∗
2, z
∗
2) satisfies
the saddle property for (F1, F2).
Proof. The statement (i) is immediate. For (ii), since
(x∗1, z∗1 ,x∗2, z∗2) satisfies the saddle property, and the net-
works are strongly connected and weight-balanced, we
have x∗1 = 1n1 ⊗x∗1, x∗1 ∈ Rd1 , x∗2 = 1n2 ⊗x∗2, x∗2 ∈ Rd2 ,
L1z
∗
1 ∈ −∂x1U˜(x∗1,x∗2), and L2z∗2 ∈ ∂x2U˜(x∗1,x∗2).
Thus there exist gi1,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
) ∈ ∂x1f i1(x∗1, x∗2), i ∈
{1, . . . , n1}, and gj2,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
) ∈ −∂x2f j2 (x∗1, x∗2), j ∈
{1, . . . , n2}, such that
L1z
∗
1 = (g
1
1,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
), , . . . , g
n
1,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
)))
T , and
L2z
∗
2 = (g
1
2,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
), , . . . , g
n
2,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
)))
T .
Noting that, for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, (1Tnℓ ⊗ Idℓ)Lℓ = (1Tnℓ ⊗
Idℓ)(Lℓ ⊗ Idℓ) = 1TnℓL ⊗ Idℓ = 0dℓ×dℓnℓ , we deduce that∑n1
i=1 g
i
1,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
) = 0d1 and
∑n2
j=1 g
j
2,(x∗
1
,x∗
2
) = 0d2 , i.e.,
(x∗1,x
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. Finally for proving (iii),
note that x∗1 = 1n1 ⊗ x∗1 and x∗2 = 1n2 ⊗ x∗2. The result
follows then from the fact that 0 ∈ ∂x1U(x∗1, x∗2) and
0 ∈ ∂x2U(x∗1, x∗2) implies that there exists z∗1 ∈ Rn1d1
and z∗2 ∈ Rn2d2 with L1z∗1 ∈ ∂x1U˜(x∗1,x∗2) and L2z∗2 ∈
−∂x2U˜(x∗1,x∗2). ✷
4 Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria
for undirected topologies
In this section, we introduce a distributed dynamics
which solves (7) when Σ1 and Σ2 are undirected. In par-
ticular, we design gradient dynamics to find points with
the saddle property for (F1, F2) prescribed by Proposi-
tion 3.4. Consider the set-valued dynamics ΨNash-undir :
(Rd1n1)2 × (Rd2n2)2 ⇒ (Rd1n1)2 × (Rd2n2)2,
x˙1 + L1x1 + L1z1 ∈ ∂x1 U˜(x1,x2), (8a)
z˙1 = L1x1, (8b)
x˙2 + L2x2 + L2z2 ∈ −∂x2U˜(x1,x2), (8c)
z˙2 = L2x2, (8d)
where xℓ, zℓ ∈ Rnℓdℓ , ℓ ∈ {1, 2}. Note that (8a)-(8b)
and (8c)-(8d) correspond to saddle-point dynamics of
F1 in (x1, z1) and F2 in (x2, z2), respectively. Local so-
lutions to this dynamics exist by virtue of Lemmas 2.1
and 2.3. We characterize next its asymptotic conver-
gence properties.
Theorem 4.1 (Distributed convergence to Nash
equilibria for undirected networks): Consider the
zero-sum game Gadv-net = (Σ1,Σ2,Σeng, U), with Σ1
andΣ2 connected undirected graphs, X1 ⊂ Rd1 , X2 ⊂ Rd2
compact and convex, and U : X1 × X2 → R strictly
concave-convex and locally Lipschitz. Assume Gadv-net
can be lifted to G˜adv-net. Then, the projection onto the
first and third components of the solutions of (8) asymp-
totically converge to agreement on the Nash equilibrium
of Gadv-net.
Proof. Throughout this proof, since property (5b)
holds, without loss of generality and for simplicity
of notation, we assume that agents in Σ1 have ac-
cess to x2 and, similarly, agents in Σ2 have access
to x1. By Theorem 2.5, a solution to (6) exists. By
the strict concavity-convexity properties, this solu-
tion is, in fact, unique. Let us denote this solution by
x
∗
1 = 1n1⊗x∗1 and x∗2 = 1n2⊗x∗2. By Proposition 3.4(iii),
there exists z∗1 and z
∗
2 such that (x
∗
1, z
∗
1 ,x
∗
2, z
∗
2) ∈
Eq(ΨNash-undir). First, note that given any initial con-
dition (x01, z
0
1 ,x
0
2, z
0
2) ∈ (Rn1d1)2 × (Rn2d2)2, the set
W
z
0
1
,z0
2
= {(x1, z1,x2, z2) |
(1Tnℓ ⊗ Idℓ)zℓ = (1Tnℓ ⊗ Idℓ)z0ℓ , ℓ ∈ {1, 2}} (9)
is strongly positively invariant under (8). Consider the
function V : (Rd1n1)2 × (Rd2n2)2 → R≥0 defined by
V (x1, z1,x2, z2)
=
1
2
(x1 − x∗1)T (x1 − x∗1) +
1
2
(z1 − z∗1)T (z1 − z∗1)
+
1
2
(x2 − x∗2)T (x2 − x∗2) +
1
2
(z2 − z∗2)T (z2 − z∗2).
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The function V is smooth. Next, we examine its
set-valued Lie derivative along ΨNash-undir. Let ξ ∈
L˜ΨNash-undirV (x1, z1,x2, z2). By definition, there exists
v ∈ ΨNash-undir(x1, z1,x2, z2), given by
v = (− L1x1 − L1z1 + g1,(x1,x2),
− L2x2 − L2z2 − g2,(x1,x2),L1x1,L2x2),
where g1,(x1,x2) ∈ ∂x1U(x1,x2) and g2,(x1,x2) ∈
∂x2U(x1,x2), such that
ξ = v · ∇V (x1, z1,x2, z2)
= (x1 − x∗1)T (−L1x1 − L1z1 + g1,(x1,x2))
+ (x2 − x∗2)T (−L2x2 − L2z2 − g2,(x1,x2))
+ (z1 − z∗1)TL1x1 + (z2 − z∗2)TL2x2.
Note that−L1x1−L1z1+g1,(x1,x2) ∈ −∂x1F1(x1, z1,x2),
L1x1 ∈ ∂z1F1(x1, z1,x2), −L2x2 − L2z2 − g2,(x1,x2) ∈
−∂x2F2(x1, z2,x2), and L2x2 ∈ ∂z2F2(x2, z2,x1). Us-
ing the first-order convexity property of F1 and F2 in
their first two arguments, one gets
ξ ≤ F1(x∗1, z1,x2)− F1(x1, z1,x2) + F2(x∗2, z2,x1)
− F2(x2, z2,x1) + F1(x1, z1,x2)− F1(x1, z∗1 ,x2)
+ F2(x2, z2,x1)− F2(x2, z∗2 ,x1).
Expanding each term and using the fact that (x∗1, z
∗
1 ,x
∗
2, z
∗
2)∈ Eq(ΨNash-undir), we simplify this inequality as
ξ ≤ −U˜(x∗1,x2) + U˜(x1,x∗2)− z∗1L1x1
− 1
2
x1L1x1 − z∗2L2x2 −
1
2
x2L2x2.
By rearranging, we thus have
ξ ≤ −F2(x2, z∗2 ,x∗1)− F1(x1, z∗1 ,x∗2).
Next, since F2(x
∗
1, z
∗
2 ,x
∗
2)+F1(x
∗
2, z
∗
2 ,x
∗
1) = 0, we have
ξ ≤ F1(x∗1, z∗1 ,x∗2)− F1(x1, z∗1 ,x∗2)
+ F2(x
∗
2, z
∗
2 ,x
∗
1)− F2(x2, z∗2 ,x∗1),
yielding that ξ ≤ 0. As a result,
max L˜ΨNash-undirV (x1, z1,x2, z2) ≤ 0.
As a by-product, we conclude that the trajectories
of (8) are bounded. By virtue of the set-valued version
of the LaSalle Invariance Principle, cf. Theorem 2.4,
any trajectory of (8) starting from an initial condition
(x01, z
0
1 ,x
0
2, z
0
2) converges to the largest positively invari-
ant set M in SΨNash-undir,V ∩ V −1(≤ V (x01, z01 ,x02, z02)).
Let (x1, z1,x2, z2) ∈ M . Because M ⊂ SΨNash-undir,V ,
then F1(x
∗
1, z
∗
1 ,x
∗
2)− F1(x1, z∗1 ,x∗2) = 0, i.e.,
− U˜(x∗1,x∗2) + U˜(x1,x∗2)− xT1 L1z∗1 −
1
2
x
T
1 L1x1 = 0.
(10)
Define now G1 : R
n1d1 × Rn1d1 × Rn2d2 → R by
G1(x1, z1,x2) = F1(x1, z1,x2) − 12xT1 L1x1. G1 is con-
vex in its first argument and linear in its second. Further-
more, for fixed x2, the map (x1, z1) 7→ G1(x1, z1,x2)
has the same saddle points as (x1, z1) 7→ F1(x1, z1,x2).
As a result, G1(x
∗
1, z
∗
1 ,x
∗
2) − G1(x1, z∗1 ,x∗2) ≤ 0, or
equivalently, −U˜(x∗1,x∗2) + U˜(x1,x∗2) − xT1 L1z∗1 ≤ 0.
Combining this with (10), we have that L1x1 = 0
and −U˜(x∗1,x∗2) + U˜(x1,x∗2) = 0. Since U˜ is strictly
concave in its first argument x1 = x
∗
1. A similar ar-
gument establishes that x2 = x
∗
2. Using now the fact
that M is weakly positively invariant, one can deduce
that Lℓzℓ ∈ −∂xℓU˜(x1,x2), for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, and thus
(x1, z1,x2, z2) ∈ Eq(ΨNash-undir). ✷
5 Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria
for directed topologies
Interestingly, the saddle-point dynamics (8) fails to con-
verge when transcribed to the directed network setting.
This observation is a consequence of the following result,
which studies the stability of the linearization of the dy-
namics (8), when the payoff functions have no contribu-
tion to the linear part.
Lemma 5.1 (Necessary condition for the conver-
gence of (8) on digraphs): Let Σℓ be strongly con-
nected and f iℓ = 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , nℓ}, for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}. Then,
the set of network agreement configurations Sagree =
{(1n1 ⊗ x1,1n1 ⊗ z1,1n2 ⊗ x2,1n2 ⊗ z2) ∈ (Rn1d1)2 ×
(Rn2d2)2 | xℓ, zℓ ∈ Rdℓ , ℓ ∈ {1, 2}}, is stable under (8)
iff, for any nonzero eigenvalue λ of the Laplacian Lℓ,
ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, one has √3|Im(λ)| ≤ Re(λ).
Proof. In this case, (8) is linear with matrix((−1 −1
1 0
)⊗ L1 0
0
(−1 −1
1 0
)⊗ L2
)
(11)
and has Sagree as equilibria. The eigenvalues of (11) are
of the form λℓ
(−1
2 ±
√
3
2 i
)
, with λℓ an eigenvalue ofLℓ, for
ℓ ∈ {1, 2} (since the eigenvalues of a Kronecker product
are the product of the eigenvalues of the corresponding
matrices). Since Lℓ = Lℓ ⊗ Idℓ , each eigenvalue of Lℓ is
an eigenvalue of Lℓ. The result follows by noting that
Re
(
λℓ
(−1
2 ±
√
3
2 i
))
= 12 (∓
√
3Im(λℓ)− Re(λℓ)). ✷
It is not difficult to construct examples of strictly
concave-convex functions that have zero contribu-
tion to the linearization of (8) around the solution.
Therefore, such systems cannot be convergent if they
fail the necessary condition identified in Lemma 5.1.
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The counterexample provided in our recent pa-
per (Gharesifard and Corte´s, 2012c) of strongly con-
nected, weight-balanced digraphs that do not meet the
stability criterium of Lemma 5.1 is therefore valid in
this context too.
From here on, we assume that the payoff functions are
differentiable. We elaborate on the reasons for this as-
sumption in Remark 5.3 later. Motivated by the obser-
vation made in Lemma 5.1, we introduce a parameter
α ∈ R>0 in the dynamics of (8) as
x˙1 + αL1x1 + L1z1 = ∇U˜(x1,x2), (12a)
z˙1 = L1x1, (12b)
x˙2 + αL2x2 + L2sz2 = −∇U˜(x1,x2), (12c)
z˙2 = L2x2. (12d)
We next show that a suitable choice of α makes the
dynamics convergent to the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.2 (Distributed convergence to Nash
equilibria for directed networks):Consider the zero-
sum game Gadv-net = (Σ1,Σ2,Σeng, U), with Σ1 and Σ2
strongly connected and weight-balanced digraphs, X1 ⊂
R
d1 , X2 ⊂ Rd2 compact and convex, and U : X1 × X2 →
R strictly concave-convex and differentiable with glob-
ally Lipschitz gradient. Assume Gadv-net can be lifted to
G˜adv-net such that U˜ is differentiable and has a globally
Lipschitz gradient. Define h : R>0 → R by
h(r) =
1
2
Λmin∗
(√(r4 + 3r2 + 2
r
)2
− 4− r
4 + 3r2 + 2
r
)
+
Kr2
(1 + r2)
, (13)
where Λmin∗ = minℓ=1,2{Λ∗(Lℓ + LTℓ )}, Λ∗(·) denotes the
smallest non-zero eigenvalue and K ∈ R>0 is the Lip-
schitz constant of the gradient of U˜ . Then there exists
β∗ ∈ R>0 with h(β∗) = 0 such that for all 0 < β < β∗,
the projection onto the first and third components of the
solutions of (12) with α = β
2+2
β
asymptotically converge
to agreement on the Nash equilibrium of Gadv-net.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we as-
sume, without loss of generality, that agents in Σ1
have access to x2 and agents in Σ2 to x1. For conve-
nience, we denote the dynamics described in (12) by
ΨNash-dir : (R
d1n1)2 × (Rd2n2)2 → (Rd1n1)2 × (Rd2n2)2.
Let (x01, z
0
1 ,x
0
2, z
0
2) be an arbitrary initial condition.
Note that the set W
z
0
1
,z0
2
defined by (9) is invariant un-
der the evolutions of (12). By an argument similar to the
one in the proof of Theorem 4.1, there exists a unique
solution to (7), which we denote by x∗1 = 1n1 ⊗ x∗1
and x∗2 = 1n2 ⊗ x∗2. By Proposition 3.4(i), there exists
(x∗1, z∗1 ,x∗2, z∗2) ∈ Eq(ΨNash-dir) ∩Wz01,z02 . Consider the
function V : (Rd1n1)2 × (Rd2n2)2 → R≥0,
V (x1, z1,x2, z2)
=
1
2
(x1 − x∗1)T (x1 − x∗1) +
1
2
(x2 − x∗2)T (x2 − x∗2)
+
1
2
(y(x1,z1) − y(x∗1,z∗1 ))T (y(x1,z1) − y(x∗1 ,z∗1)),
+
1
2
(y(x2,z2) − y(x∗2,z∗2 ))T (y(x2,z2) − y(x∗2 ,z∗2)),
where y(xℓ,zℓ) = βxℓ + zℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, and β ∈
R>0 satisfies β
2 − αβ + 2 = 0. This function is
quadratic, hence smooth. Next, we consider ξ =
LΨNash-dirV (x1, z1,x2, z2) given by
ξ = (−αL1x1 − L1z1 +∇U˜(x1,x2),L1x1,−αL2x2
− L2z2 −∇U˜(x1,x2),L2x2) · ∇V (x1, z1,x2, z2).
After some manipulation, one can show that
ξ =
2∑
ℓ=1
1
2
(xℓ − x∗ℓ ,y(xℓ,zℓ) − y(x∗ℓ ,z∗ℓ ))
TAℓ(xl,y(xℓ,zℓ))
+
2∑
ℓ=1
1
2
(xTℓ ,y
T
(xℓ,zℓ)
)ATℓ (xℓ − x∗ℓ ,y(xℓ,zℓ) − y(x∗ℓ ,z∗ℓ ))
+
2∑
ℓ=1
(−1)j−1(xℓ − x∗ℓ )T∇xℓ U˜(x1,x2)
+
2∑
ℓ=1
(−1)j−1β(y(xℓ,zℓ) − y(x∗ℓ ,z∗ℓ ))T∇xℓU˜(x1,x2),
where Aℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, is
Aℓ =
(
−(α− β)Lℓ −Lℓ
(−β(α− β) + 1)Lℓ −βLℓ
)
.
This equation can be written as
ξ =
2∑
ℓ=1
1
2
(xℓ − x∗ℓ ,y(xℓ,zℓ) − y(x∗ℓ ,z∗ℓ ))T
Qℓ(xℓ − x∗ℓ ,y(xℓ,zℓ) − y(x∗ℓ ,z∗ℓ ))
+
2∑
ℓ=1
(xℓ − x∗ℓ ,y(xℓ,zℓ) − y(x∗ℓ ,z∗ℓ ))
TAℓ(x
∗
ℓ ,y(x∗
ℓ
,z∗
ℓ
))
+
2∑
ℓ=1
(−1)j−1(xℓ − x∗ℓ )T∇xℓ U˜(x1,x2)
+
2∑
ℓ=1
(−1)j−1β(y(xℓ,zℓ) − y(x∗ℓ ,z∗ℓ ))
T∇xℓU˜(x1,x2),
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where Qℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, is given by
Qℓ = (Lℓ + L
T
ℓ )⊗
(
−(β2+2
β
− β) −1
−1 −β
)
. (14)
Note that, we have
A1(x
∗
1,y(x∗1,z∗1)) = −(L1y(x∗1 ,z∗1), βL1y(x∗1 ,z∗1))
= −(∇x1U˜(x∗1,x2), β∇x1 U˜(x∗1,x2)),
A2(x
∗
2,y(x∗2,z∗2)) = −(L2y(x∗2 ,z∗2), βL2y(x∗2 ,z∗2))
= (∇x2U˜(x1,x∗2), β∇x2 U˜(x1,x∗2)).
Thus, after substituting for y(xℓ,zℓ), we have
ξ =
2∑
ℓ=1
1
2
(xℓ − x∗ℓ , zℓ − z∗ℓ )T Q˜ℓ(xℓ − x∗ℓ , zℓ − z∗ℓ )
+ (1 + β2)(x1 − x∗1)T (∇x1 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x1 U˜(x∗1,x2))
− (1 + β2)(x2 − x∗2)T (∇x2 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x2 U˜(x1,x∗2))
+ β(z1 − z∗1)T (∇x1 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x1U˜(x∗1,x2))
− β(z2 − z∗2)T (∇x2 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x2U˜(x1,x∗2)), (15)
where
Q˜ℓ =
(
−β3 − (β2+2
β
)− β −(1 + β2)
−(1 + β2) −β
)
⊗ (Lℓ + LTℓ ),
for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}. Each eigenvalue of Q˜ℓ is of the form
η˜ℓ = λℓ
−(β4 + 3β2 + 2)±√(β4 + 3β2 + 2)2 − 4β2
2β
,
(16)
where λℓ is an eigenvalue of Lℓ + L
T
ℓ , ℓ ∈ {1, 2}. Using
now Theorem A.1 twice, one for (x1,x2), (x
∗
1,x2), and
another one for (x1,x2), (x1,x
∗
2), we have
(x1 − x∗1)T (∇x1 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x1 U˜(x∗1,x2)) ≤
− 1
K
(
||∇x1U˜(x1,x2)−∇x1U˜(x∗1,x2)||2
)
,
−(x2 − x∗2)T (∇x2 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x2 U˜(x1,x∗2)) ≤
− 1
K
(
||∇x2U˜(x1,x2)−∇x2U˜(x1,x∗2)||2
)
,
where K ∈ R>0 is the Lipschitz constant of ∇U˜ . We
thus conclude that
ξ ≤
2∑
ℓ=1
1
2
(xℓ − x∗ℓ , zℓ − z∗ℓ )T Q˜ℓ(xℓ − x∗ℓ , zℓ − z∗ℓ )
− (1 + β
2)
K
(||∇x1U˜(x1,x2)−∇x1 U˜(x∗1,x2)||2
+ ||∇x2U˜(x1,x2)−∇x2 U˜(x1,x∗2)||2
)
+ β(z1 − z∗1)T (∇x1 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x1U˜(x∗1,x2))
− β(z2 − z∗2)T (∇x2 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x2U˜(x1,x∗2)).
One can write this inequality as displayed in (17), where
X = (x1 − x∗1, z1 − z∗1 ,x2 − x∗2, z2 − z∗2 ,
∇x1 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x1 U˜(x∗1,x2),
∇x2 U˜(x1,x2)−∇x2 U˜(x1,x∗2)).
Since (x1, z1,x2, z2) ∈ Wz0
1
,z0
2
, we have (1Tnℓ ⊗ Idℓ)(zℓ−
z
∗
ℓ ) = 0dℓ , ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, and hence it is enough to establish
that Q is negative semidefinite on the subspace W =
{(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6) ∈ (Rn1d1)2 × (Rn2d2)2 × Rn1d1 ×
R
n2d2 | (1Tn1 ⊗ Id1)v2 = 0d1 , (1Tn2 ⊗ Id2)v4 = 0n2}. Using
the fact that− 1
K
(1+β2)Inℓdℓ is invertible, for ℓ ∈ {1, 2},
we can express Q as
Q =
N

Q¯1 0 0 0
0 Q¯2 0 0
0 0 − 1
K
(1 + β2)In1d1 0
0 0 0 − 1
K
(1 + β2)In2d2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
NT ,
where Q¯ℓ = Q˜ℓ +
Kβ2
(1+β2)
(
0 0
0 Inℓdℓ
)
, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, and
N =

In1d1 0 0 0 0 0
0 In1d1 0 0 − βK1+β2 In1d1 0
0 0 In2d2 0 0 0
0 0 0 In2d2 0
βK
1+β2 In2d2
0 0 0 0 In1d1 0
0 0 0 0 0 In2d2

.
Noting thatW is invariant under NT (i.e., NTW =W),
all we need to check is that the matrix D is negative
semidefinite onW . Clearly,(
− 1
K
(1+β2)In1d1 0
0 − 1
K
(1+β2)In2d2
)
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ξ ≤ 1
2
XT

Q1,11 Q1,12 0 0 0 0
Q1,21 Q1,22 0 0 βIn1d1 0
0 0 Q2,11 Q2,12 0 0
0 0 Q2,21 Q2,22 0 −βIn2d2
0 βIn1d1 0 0 − (1+β
2)
K
In1d1 0
0 0 0 −βIn2d2 0 − (1+β
2)
K
In2d2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
X, (17)
is negative definite. On the other hand, for ℓ ∈ {1, 2},
on (Rnℓdℓ)2, 0 is an eigenvalue of Q˜ℓ with multiplic-
ity 2dℓ and eigenspace generated by vectors of the form
(1nℓ ⊗ a, 0) and (0,1nℓ ⊗ b), with a, b ∈ Rdℓ . However,
on {(v1, v2) ∈ (Rnℓdℓ)2 | (1Tnℓ ⊗ Idℓ)v2 = 0dℓ}, 0 is an
eigenvalue of Q˜ℓ with multiplicity dℓ and eigenspace gen-
erated by vectors of the form (1nℓ ⊗ a, 0). Moreover, on
{(v1, v2) ∈ (Rnℓdℓ)2 | (1Tnℓ ⊗ Idℓ)v2 = 0dℓ}, the eigen-
values of Kβ
2
(1+β2)
(
0 0
0 In
ℓ
d
ℓ
)
are Kβ
2
(1+β2) with multiplicity
nℓdℓ − dℓ and 0 with multiplicity nℓdℓ. Therefore, us-
ing Weyl’s theorem (Horn and Johnson, 1985, Theorem
4.3.7), we deduce that the nonzero eigenvalues of the
sum Q¯ℓ are upper bounded by Λ∗(Q˜ℓ) + Kβ
2
(1+β2) . Thus,
the eigenvalues of Q¯ =
(
Q¯1 0
0 Q¯2
)
are upper bounded by
minℓ=1,2{Λ∗(Q¯ℓ)} + Kβ
2
(1+β2) . From (16) and the defini-
tion of h in (13), we conclude that the nonzero eigenval-
ues of Q¯ are upper bounded by h(β). It remains to show
that there exists β∗ ∈ R>0 with h(β∗) = 0 such that
for all 0 < β < β∗ we have h(β) < 0. For r > 0 small
enough, h(r) < 0, since h(r) = − 12Λmin∗ r + O(r2). Fur-
thermore, limr→∞ h(r) = K > 0. Hence, using theMean
Value Theorem, we deduce the existence of β∗. There-
fore we conclude that LΨNash-dirV (x1, z1,x2, z2) ≤ 0.
As a by-product, the trajectories of (8) are bounded.
Consequently, all assumptions of the LaSalle Invariance
Principle, cf. Theorem 2.4, are satisfied. This result then
implies that any trajectory of (8) starting from an ini-
tial condition (x01, z
0
1 ,x
0
2, z
0
2) converges to the largest
invariant set M in SΨNash-dir,V ∩ Wz01,z02 . Note that if
(x1, z1,x2, z2) ∈ SΨNash-dir,V ∩ Wz01 ,z02 , then NTX ∈
ker(Q¯)×{0}. From the discussion above, we know ker(Q¯)
is generated by vectors of the form (1n1 ⊗ a1, 0, 0, 0),
(0, 0,1n2 ⊗ a2, 0), aℓ ∈ Rdℓ , j ∈ {1, 2}, and hence xℓ =
x
∗
ℓ + 1nℓ ⊗ aℓ, zℓ = z∗ℓ . Using the strict concavity-
convexity, this then implies that xℓ = x
∗
ℓ . Finally, for
(x∗1, z1,x
∗
2, z2) ∈M , using the positive invariance ofM ,
one deduces that (x∗1, z1,x
∗
2, z2) ∈ Eq(ΨNash-dir). ✷
Remark 5.3 (Assumptions on payoff function):
Two observations are in order regarding the assump-
tions in Theorem 5.2 on the payoff function. First, the
assumption that the payoff function has a globally Lip-
schitz gradient is not too restrictive given that, since
the state spaces are compact, standard boundedness
conditions on the gradient imply the globally Lips-
chitz condition. Second, we restrict our attention to
differentiable payoff functions because locally Lipschitz
functions with globally Lipschitz generalized gradients
are in fact differentiable, see (Gharesifard and Corte´s,
2012c, Proposition A.1). •
Remark 5.4 (Comparison with best-response
dynamics): Using the gradient flow has the advan-
tage of avoiding the cumbersome computation of the
best-response map. This, however, does not come for
free. There are concave-convex functions for which the
(distributed) gradient flow dynamics, unlike the best-
response dynamics, fails to converge to the saddle point,
see (Feijer and Paganini, 2010) for an example. •
We finish this section with an example.
Example 5.5 (Distributed adversarial selection
of signal and noise power via (12)): Recall the com-
munication scenario described in Remark 3.1. Consider
5 channels, {ch1, ch2, ch3, ch4, ch5}, for which the net-
work Σ1 has decided that {ch1, ch3} have signal power
x1 and {ch2, ch4} have signal power x2. Channel ch5
has its signal power determined to satisfy the budget
constraint P ∈ R>0, i.e., P − 2x1 − 2x2. Similarly,
the network Σ2 has decided that ch1 has noise power
y1, {ch2, ch3, ch4} have noise power y2, and ch5 has
noise power C − y1 − 3y2 to meet the budget con-
straint C ∈ R>0. We let x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) and
y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5), where xi = (xi1, x
i
2) ∈ [0, P ]2
and yi = (yi1, y
i
2) ∈ [0, C]2, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
The networks Σ1 and Σ2, which are weight-balanced and
strongly connected, and the engagement topology Σeng
are shown in Figure 2. Note that, according to this topol-
ogy, each agent can observe the power employed by its
adversary in its channel and, additionally, the agents in
channel 2 can obtain information about the estimates
of the opponent in channel 4 and vice versa. The payoff
functions of the agents are given in Remark 3.1, where
for simplicity we take σi = σ1, for i ∈ {1, 3, 5}, and
σi = σ2, for i ∈ {2, 4}, with σ1, σ2 ∈ R>0.
This example fits into the approach described in Sec-
tion 3.1 by considering the following extended payoff
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v1
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w3
Fig. 2. Networks Σ1, Σ2 and Σeng for the case study of Ex-
ample 5.5. Edges which correspond to Σeng are dashed. For
i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, agents vi and wi are placed in channel chi.
functions:
f˜11 (x
1,y) = log(1 +
βx11
σ1 + y11
),
f˜21 (x
2,y) =
1
3
log(1 +
βx22
σ2 + y42
) +
2
3
log(1 +
βx22
σ2 + y22
),
f˜31 (x
3,y) = log(1 +
βx31
σ1 + y32
),
f˜41 (x
4,y) =
1
3
log(1 +
βx42
σ2 + y22
) +
2
3
log(1 +
βx42
σ2 + y42
),
f˜51 (x
5,y) = log
(
1 +
β(P − 2x51 − 2x52)
σ1 + C − y51 − 3y52
)
,
f˜12 (x, y
1) =f˜11 (x
1,y), f˜32 (x, y
3) = f˜31 (x
3,y),
f˜22 (x, y
2) =
2
3
log(1 +
βx22
σ2 + y22
) +
1
3
log(1 +
βx42
σ2 + y22
),
f˜42 (x, y
4) =
1
3
log(1 +
βx22
σ2 + y42
) +
2
3
log(1 +
βx42
σ2 + y42
),
f˜52 (x, y
5) =f˜51 (x
5,y).
Note that these functions are strictly concave and thus
the zero-sum game defined has a unique saddle point
on the set [0, P ]2 × [0, C]2. These functions satisfy (5)
and U˜1 = U˜2. Figure 3 shows the convergence of the
dynamics (12) to the Nash equilibrium of the resulting
2-network zero-sum game. •
6 Conclusions and future work
We have considered a class of strategic scenarios in which
two networks of agents are involved in a zero-sum game.
The networks aim to either maximize or minimize a
common objective function. Individual agents collabo-
rate with neighbors in their respective network and have
partial knowledge of the state of the agents in the other
one. We have introduced two aggregate objective func-
tions, one per network, identified a family of points with
a special saddle property for this pair of functions, and
established their correspondence between the Nash equi-
libria of the overall game. When the individual networks
are undirected, we have proposed a distributed saddle-
point dynamics that is implementable by each network
via local interactions. We have shown that, for a class
of strictly concave-convex and locally Lipschitz objec-
tive functions, the proposed dynamics is guaranteed to
converge to the Nash equilibrium. We have also shown
that this saddle-point dynamics fails to converge for di-
rected networks, even when they are strongly connected
and weight-balanced. Motivated by this fact, we have in-
troduced a generalization that incorporates a design pa-
rameter. We have shown that this dynamics converges
to the Nash equilibrium for strictly concave-convex and
differentiable objective functions with globally Lipschitz
gradients for appropriate parameter choices. An inter-
esting venue of research is determining whether it is al-
ways possible to choose the extensions of the individual
payoff functions in such a way that the lifted objective
functions coincide. Future work will also include relax-
ing the assumptions of strict concavity-convexity and
differentiability of the payoff functions, and the glob-
ally Lipschitz condition on their gradients, extending
our results to dynamic interaction topologies and non-
zero sum games, and exploring the application to various
areas, including collaborative resource allocation in the
presence of adversaries, strategic social networks, collec-
tive bargaining, and collaborative pursuit-evasion.
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A Appendix
The following result can be understood as a generaliza-
tion of the characterization of cocoercivity of concave
functions (Golshtein and Tretyakov, 1996, Lemma 6.7).
Theorem A.1 (Concave-convex differentiable
functions with globally Lipschitz gradients): Let
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f : Rd1 × Rd2 → R be a concave-convex differentiable
function with globally Lipschitz gradient (with Lipschitz
constant K ∈ R>0). For (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ Rd1 × Rd2 ,
(x− x′)T (∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x′, y′))
+ (y − y′)T (∇yf(x′, y′)−∇yf(x, y))
≤− 1
2K
(
‖∇xf(x, y′)−∇xf(x′, y′)‖2
+ ‖∇yf(x′, y)−∇yf(x′, y′)‖2
+ ‖∇xf(x′, y)−∇xf(x, y)‖2
+ ‖∇yf(x, y′)−∇yf(x, y)‖2
)
.
Proof. We start by noting that, for a concave function
j : Rd → R with globally Lipschitz gradient, the fol-
lowing inequality holds, see (Golshtein and Tretyakov,
1996, Equation 6.64),
j(x) ≤ j∗ − 1
2M
||∇j(x)||2, (A.1)
where j∗ = supx∈Rd j(x) andM is the Lipschitz constant
of ∇j. Given (x′, y′) ∈ Rd1 × Rd2 , define the map f˜ :
R
d1 × Rd2 → R by
f˜(x, y) = f(x, y)− f(x′, y)− (x− x′)T∇xf(x′, y)
+ f(x, y)− f(x, y′) + (y − y′)T∇yf(x, y′).
Since the gradient of f is Lipschitz, the function f˜ is
differentiable almost everywhere. Thus, almost every-
where, we have
∇xf˜(x, y) = ∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x′, y) +∇xf(x, y)
−∇xf(x, y′)− (y − y′)T∇x∇yf(x, y′),
∇y f˜(x, y) = ∇yf(x, y)−∇yf(x′, y) +∇yf(x, y)
−∇yf(x, y′)− (x − x′)T∇y∇xf(x′, y).
In particular, note that ∇xf˜(x′, y′) = ∇y f˜(x′, y′) = 0.
Since x 7→ f˜(x, y′) and y 7→ f˜(x′, y) are concave and con-
vex functions, respectively, we can use (A.1) to deduce
f˜(x, y′) ≤ − 1
2K
||∇xf(x, y′)−∇xf(x′, y′)||2, (A.2a)
−f˜(x′, y) ≤ − 1
2K
||∇yf(x′, y)−∇yf(x′, y′)||2, (A.2b)
where we have used the fact that supx∈Rd1 f˜(x, y′) =
infy∈Rd2 f˜(x′, y) = f˜(x′, y′) = 0. Next, by definition of f˜ ,
f˜(x, y′) = f(x, y′)− f(x′, y′)− (x− x′)T∇xf(x′, y′),
f˜(x′, y) = f(x′, y)− f(x′, y′)− (y − y′)T∇yf(x′, y′).
Using (A.2), we deduce that
f(x, y′)− f(x′, y)
− (x− x′)T∇xf(x′, y′) + (y − y′)T∇yf(x′, y′)
≤ − 1
2K
(‖∇xf(x, y′)−∇xf(x′, y′)‖2
+ ‖∇yf(x′, y)−∇yf(x′, y′)‖2
)
. (A.3)
The claim now follows by adding together (A.3) and
the inequality that results by interchanging (x, y) and
(x′, y′) in (A.3). ✷
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